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Recent literature on tax evasion emphasizes the importance of moral considerations to 
explain compliance behavior. As a consequence scholars aim to identify factors that shape 
this so-called tax morale. However, the causal link between tax morale and actual 
compliance behavior is not established yet. Exploiting exogenous variation in tax morale – 
given by the inherited part of tax morale of American-born from their ancestors’ country of 
origin – our instrumental variable analysis provides first evidence on a causal effect of tax 
morale on the size of the underground production. 
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It is a well-known fact that neo-classical models of tax compliance over-predict real-world
compliance (Alm, McClelland and Schulze, 1992). Many scholars, therefore, concluded that
the explanation for the tendency to comply must be that individuals are obeying a norm
(Posner, 2000). Theoretical papers incorporated individuals with an intrinsic motivation
to comply (e.g. Gordon, 1989; Erard and Feinstein, 1994; Traxler, 2010). More recently,
an increasing number of empirical papers try to quantify the intrinsic motivation to pay
taxes (usually called tax morale ) with survey data.
Typically, these papers try to identify factors (both on an individual- or on a more
aggregated-level) that are correlated with a high level of tax morale (e.g. Torgler, 2006;
Frey and Torgler, 2007). By now, a substantial amount of empirical evidence on the associ-
ation between tax morale and several socio-demographic characteristics from national and
international samples is available. Further, a number of papers study di￿erent institutional
arrangements that are correlated with a high level of tax morale.1
Clearly, this strand of literature presumes that tax morale a￿ects actual compliance.
But tax morale captured by survey data, does not measure individual behavior but an
individual attitude. A high tax morale does not necessarily translate into a high level of
tax compliance. However, the existence of a causal link between tax morale and actual tax
compliance behavior determines the signi￿cance of this literature. This causal link is not
established yet. In fact, relatively little empirical evidence (to be discussed below) on the
impact of tax morale on actual compliance behavior exists.
As a matter of fact it is extremely hard to identify this causal link. First, one has to
obtain and quantify both dimensions. In the case of tax compliance, this is a non-trivial
problem, since any form of non-compliance is di￿cult to observe. Naturally non-compliant
tax payers will try to hide their deviant behavior in order to avoid punishment. That means,
tax evasion cannot be observed and has to be estimated. Tax morale has to be obtained
by adequate survey techniques. Given that one can observe and link both dimensions, a
credible research design to establish a causal e￿ect is needed.
On an individual-level a number of papers use survey data to contrast self-reported tax
evasion with di￿erent measurements of an intrinsic motivation to comply with the tax code.
One obvious critique of this research design is the questionable accuracy of self-reported tax
evasion information. In fact, El￿ers, Weigel and Hessing (1987) show that the correlation
between actual and self-reported tax evasion is essentially zero. 2 In order to solve this
problem, scholars (e.g. Bosco and Mittone, 1997; Torgler, Scha￿ner and Macintyre, 2007)
combine tax evasion data obtained in laboratory experiments with tax morale information
from post-experiment questionnaires. As usual, the shortcoming of this data is the arti￿cial
setting in which it is generated. For instance, it is unclear whether individuals would behave
di￿erently when they deal with real tax authorities instead of experimenters. Even more
1For a survey of this literature, see, Torgler (2007).
2The authors managed to link tax audit data for approximately 700 Dutch taxpayers with survey
responses.
2importantly, the answers in the questionnaire may not be independent from the behavior
in the experiment. The correlation between these two variables can be driven by reversed
causality. Individuals may simple justify or con￿rm their own self-interested behavior
(Wenzel, 2005). Put di￿erently, in this case, actual behavior causally a￿ects tax morale,
but not vice versa.
On a more aggregate-level a number of papers present negative correlations between
the level of tax morale and the size of the shadow economy: Weck (1983), Torgler (2005b)
for Latin America, Alm and Torgler (2006) for the U.S. and Europe, Alm, Martinez-Vazque
and Torgler (2006) for several transition countries, and Barone and Mocetti (2009) for Italy.
This descriptive evidence allows several interpretations and does not necessarily imply a
causal e￿ect of tax morale on the size of the shadow economy. A confounding factor, such
as administrative ine￿ciencies in the tax system, could be the driving fore. There is also
concern for potential reversed causality; the size of the shadow economy may a￿ect tax
morale.
Most recently, Torgler and Schneider (2007, 2009); Torgler, Scha￿ner and Macintyre
(2007) address this identi￿cation problem and suggest instrumental variable approaches
to disentangle a causal e￿ect. Each paper has a di￿erent focus and the suggested instru-
mental variables vary.3 All papers use a Two-Stage Least Squares estimation and ￿nd a
statistically signi￿cant negative e￿ect of tax morale on the size of the shadow economy.
However, as discussed by Halla (forthcoming), in each case there are plausible arguments
for the invalidity of the instruments. For instance, it is hard to rule out that the instru-
mental variable ‘weather conditions’ does not have a direct e￿ect on the size of the shadow
economy. The construction industry, a sector which is di￿cult to tax and known for high
underground activities, is a￿ected by weather conditions. In general, bad weather slows
down construction activity, and may also reduce the size of the shadow economy. 4
In this paper we also study the link between tax morale and the shadow economy (or
more precisely the underground production). To deal with potential endogeneity problems
we suggest to exploit exogenous variation in tax morale given by the inherited part of tax
morale. In particular, we follow an approach inspired by Rice and Feldman (1997) and
estimate the tax morale inherited by the American-born from their ancestors country of
origin. We show that tax morale of second-generation Americans are mainly and signif-
icantly in￿uenced by the country of origin of their ancestors. This phenomenon can be
explained by a causal e￿ect of inherited moral values. We argue then that this inherited
3Torgler and Schneider (2009) present a cross-sectional analysis of the e￿ect of tax morale and insti-
tutional quality on the size of the shadow economy, where the authors try to account for the endogeneity
of tax morale and institutional quality with a set of instrumental variables, such as legal origins of com-
mercial laws. Torgler, Scha￿ner and Macintyre (2007) include a panel data analysis of the impact of tax
morale on the size of the shadow economy, where weather conditions (a measure for cloudiness) serves
as an instrument. Torgler and Schneider (2007) employ a panel data analysis to study the e￿ect of tax
morale, institutional quality, and governance on the size of the shadow economy. To instrument for tax
morale a measure of cloudiness and an index for moral values based on data from the European and World
Values Surveys is used.
4Moreover, the link between weather conditions and tax morale (i.e. the ￿rst stage) has no theoretical
grounds and seems rather ad hoc.
3part is not a￿ected by the current economic and institutional environment. Consequently,
we use the inherited part of tax morale as an instrument for current tax morale in the
home country.5
2 The link between tax morale and compliance behavior
To measure tax morale we use data from the European and World Values Surveys (WVS).
In particular, we use responses to the following survey question: ‘Please tell me for each
of the following statements whether you think it can always be justi￿ed, never be justi￿ed,
or something in between: Cheating on taxes if you have a chance ’. Respondents are asked
to evaluate this statement on an ordered scale from ‘never justi￿able’ (1) to ‘always justi-
￿able’ (10). As discussed by Halla (forthcoming) this survey question is the best available
source to measure tax morale. Compared to other survey questions, its formulation is quite
general, and a reasonable number of respondents from a large set of countries over time is
available.
To measure (non-)compliance behavior we suggest to use an estimate of the so-called
underground production. The OECD de￿nes the underground production as ‘[...] ac-
tivities that may be both productive in an economic sense and also quite legal (provided
certain standards or regulations are complied with) but deliberately concealed from public
authorities for the following kinds of reasons: (i) to avoid payment of income, value added
or other taxes; (ii) to avoid the payment of social security contributions; (iii) to avoid
having to meet certain legal standards such as minimum wages, maximum hours, safety or
health standards, etc.; (iv) to avoid complying with certain administrative procedures, such
as completing statistical questionnaires or other administrative forms ’ (OECD, 2002, page
37). The underground production, therefore, comprises important methods of tax evasion,
such as under-reporting of income. However, it excludes others that are non-productive,
such as over-claiming deductions. Further, it covers other non-compliant behavior such as
fraudulent receipt of unemployment bene￿ts or infringement of employment regulations.
While in principal it would be preferable to contrast tax morale with an explicit es-
timate of tax evasion, this is not possible due to data limitations. We are not aware of
consistent estimates of tax evasion for a set for countries over time. Whereas estimates of
the underground production are available. Our primary data source is Schneider, Buehn
and Montenegro (2010). This World Bank report provides estimates on the size of the
underground production for a large set of countries over the period from 1999 to 2007
based on a Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes (MIMIC) model. 6
5A similar approach is used by Algan and Cahuc (2009) to study the e￿ect of civic virtue on the design
of unemployment bene￿ts and employer protection in member states of the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD). See, also Algan and Cahuc (forthcoming).
6For a comprehensive review of the available methods to estimate the size (of parts) of the shadow
economy, see, Schneider and Enste (2000). As any other method, the MIMIC model is not without critique
(see, e.g. Breusch, 2005; Dell’Anno and Schneider, 2006). However, estimates based on this method have
been successfully used in recent empirical applications such as Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobat￿n
(1998); Friedman, Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton (2000).
42.1 Descriptive evidence
In a ￿rst step we use a very simple measure of tax morale and calculate country-averages
based on individual-level data from the WVS. We combine all available country-years from
the WVS from the years 1999 through 2004 with the estimated size of the underground
production (UP) from Schneider, Buehn and Montenegro (2010). This gives us a sample of
64 countries.7 In line with the existing literature we ￿nd a negative correlation between the
level of tax morale and the estimated size of the UP. The correlation coe￿cient of minus 0:13
is quite small, however, the relation increases considerably in an OLS regression framework.
Speci￿cation OLS-I in Table1 controls for year ￿xed e￿ects. The beta coe￿cient is equal to
minus 0:274.8 That means, an increase in the level of tax morale by one standard deviation
(0:71 points) is associated with a decrease of the UP by 0:27 standard deviations. This is
equivalent to an reduction of 3:6 percentage points. This e￿ect is statistically signi￿cant at
an 3:4 percent level. When we in addition control for OECD membership (see OLS-II), we
￿nd a somewhat lower coe￿cient. This simple estimation model explains about 45 percent
of the variation in the UP.
These OLS estimates suggest that tax morale may have a positive e￿ect on compliance
behavior. However, the estimated coe￿cients are not very reliable, since a correlation be-
tween tax morale and relevant unobserved factors (such as the quality of institutions) has
to be expected. One way to mitigate the problem of unobserved heterogeneity is given by
country ￿xed e￿ects. In order to obtain longitudinal information we amend our data set
with information from four other sources.9 A cross-section analysis of this bigger sample
(see speci￿cation OLS-III) shows again a strong correlation between tax morale and the
size of the UP. The beta coe￿cient is equal to minus 0:280.10 Speci￿cation FE-I includes
country ￿xed e￿ects. The e￿ect of tax morale on the size of the UP persists. After control-
ling for unobserved country-speci￿c time-invariant heterogeneity, the estimated e￿ect even
increases in size and statistical signi￿cance. We obtain a beat coe￿cient of minus 0:340.
However, before we can conclude that tax morale does reduce the size of the UP, we
have to evaluate the credibility of the ￿xed e￿ects estimates. The ￿xed e￿ects model gives
an unbiased estimate of the causal e￿ect of tax morale, as long as it is not correlated with
time-varying unobservables that a￿ects the UP, and reversed causality can be ruled out.
However, these assumptions seem rather strong. For instance, both tax morale and com-
pliance behavior may be in￿uenced by varying factors, such as quality of institutions. Or,
7The average size of the underground production as percentage of the o￿cial GDP is in the 27 OECD
member countries 19:30 and in the 37 non-member states 35:92.
8In order to allow a comparison of the quantitative importance of tax morale across di￿erent speci￿-
cations we report in all estimation tables beta coe￿cients on tax morale in squared brackets below the
standard errors.
9Johnson, Kaufmann, Shleifer, Goldman and Weitzman (1997) provides estimates for Central and
Eastern European countries, Loayza (1996) for South American countries, Bajada and Schneider (2005)
for Asian countries, and Schneider (2005) for other OECD member states. Details on the country-years
included are provided in the notes to Table1.
10Notably, the size of the coe￿cient did almost not change due to the amendment of the UP data by
di￿erent sources.
5as argued above it is also plausible that compliance behavior has an impact on individuals’
attitude. That means, individuals justify or con￿rm their own (self-interested) behavior. If
one of these hypotheses holds, the ￿xed e￿ects estimate is inconsistent. In order to account
for these potential endogeneity problems, we suggest in the next section an instrumental
variable approach. This allows us to estimate the causal e￿ect of tax morale consistently
and free from asymptotic bias from unobserved time-varying heterogeneity.
2.2 Evidence from an instrumental variable approach
Both tax morale, and the UP are clearly a￿ected by the current economic and institutional
environment of the country in which people live and pay taxes. Our instrumental variable
(IV) approach is based on the idea that tax morale, as any other moral value or social norm,
is in addition also partly inherited over generations. This inherited part in tax morale
should not be, or at least not instantaneously, a￿ected by the economic and institutional
environment. Therefore, a quanti￿cation of the inherited part in tax morale could serve as
an IV for current tax morale.
In order to obtain an estimate of the inherited part of tax morale (that is not confounded
by the current economic and institutional environment), we use the inherited tax morale
by American-born individuals from their ancestors country of origin. In particular, we
use responses to the following tax morale question from the American General Social
Survey (GSS): ‘Consider the situations listed below. Do you feel it is wrong or not wrong
if a taxpayer does not report all of his income in order to pay less income taxes ’. The
possible answers categories are ‘not wrong’ (1), ‘a bit wrong’ (2), ‘wrong’ (3) and ‘seriously
wrong’ (4). We create a binary variable equal to one if the respondent answered ‘seriously
wrong’ or ‘wrong’, and zero otherwise. We explain the variation in this measure of tax
morale with the following linear probability model,
TMGSS
itc = GSS + GSS  XGSS
it + GSS
t + c + "GSS
itc ; (1)
where TMGSS
itc represents the tax morale of American-born respondent i in year t whose
ancestors came from country c. We control for basic socio-demographic characteristics Xit
(comprising information on sex, age, marital status and religious denomination) and the
year of the survey t. The question on tax morale was included in the GSS in the years
1991 and 1998.
Our main variables of interest are the binary variables c representing the countries of
origin c of the American-born respondent i. We argue that these binary variables capture
the inherited part of tax morale transmitted from country of origin, which is passed down
through generations. The information on the country of origin is based on the following
question: ‘From what countries or part of the world did your ancestors come? ’.11 Our
11In the case respondents named more than one country, we selected the ￿rst mentioned country other
than the USA.
6sample of 1;876 American-born respondents comprises 26 di￿erent countries of origin.12
As Table2 shows we have on average 72 observations per country of origin available.13
To get comparable estimates of tax morale in home countries we create a binary variable
based on the tax morale question from the WVS (mainly from the years 1999=2000).14
Table2 provides descriptive statistics. In line with our classi￿cation for the GSS, we divide
the scale of possible answers in half. Hence, we create a binary variable equal to one if the
respondent answered between (6) and (10), and zero otherwise. We then use an equivalent
linear probability model:
TMWV S
itc = WV S + WV S  XWV S
it + WV S
t + c + "WV S
itc ; (2)
where TMWV S
itc stands for the tax morale of respondent i in year t from home country
c. Here, the variables of main interest are the binary variables c, representing the home
country c of respondent i. The rest of the estimation model is equivalent to (1).
The ￿rst two columns of Table3 summarize the estimation results from (1) and (2).
Irrespective of the tax morale variable used, we ￿nd (as documented in the literature) that
being female, married, older, and belonging to any religious denomination is related to
a higher tax morale. The binary variables capturing the country of origin and the home
country are all highly statistically signi￿cant. The country ￿xed e￿ects associated with the
home country c are in general quantitatively more important than those of the country of
origin c. In the latter case we observe larger standard errors. This indicates that living
in the USA has a homogenizing e￿ect on tax morale.
Most importantly, Figure1 shows the inherited part of tax morale, captured by ^ c, is
highly correlated with the tax morale in the home country ^ c. The correlation coe￿cient
is equal to 0:58 and highly statistically signi￿cant (p-value= 0:002).15 This indicates that
intergenerational transmission of tax morale (that persists across space) takes place. 16 We
now explore the e￿ect of tax morale on the size of the UP based on a Two-Step Least
Square Estimation (2SLS). In particular, we estimate
UPc = 0 + 1  ^ ^ c + 2  Historical UPc + c; (3)
where UPc denotes the size of the UP of country c in the year 2000, and ^ ^ c is derived from
12Broad categories such as ‘Africa’ or ‘Asia’ have been excluded.
13For some countries the number of respondents is low. Nevertheless, we will see that all estimated
country ￿xed e￿ects are highly statistically signi￿cant. In any case, we will show in Section2.2.1 that
excluding the ￿ve countries (Belgium, Greece, Japan, Portugal and Romania) with the least number of
observations does not change our qualitative results.
14If in a country no survey has taken place in the year 1999 or 2000, we use data from the year 2001 or
1996. Details are provided in the notes to Table2.
15If we use the original scaling of the tax morale variables a strong correlation pattern between the two
alternative measures still holds. The correlation coe￿cient of 0:351 has a p-value of 0:086.
16Note, Figure1 excludes Portugal. Portugal displays a very low inherited tax morale ( PT = 0:52)
and appears to be an outlier. Including Portugal we would observe a correlation coe￿cient of 0:52 (p-
value= 0:006). We exclude Portugal from our main analysis, since this increases the strength of our ￿rst
stage. However, we will show in Section2.2.1 that including Portugal does not change our qualitative
results in the second stage.
7the ￿rst stage regression of tax morale in the home country on tax morale of Americans
by their country of origin:
^ c = 0 + 1  ^ c + 2  Historical UPc + c: (4)
Our IV estimation strategy is valid if ^ c is correlated with ^ c, but uncorrelated with any
other unobserved determinant of UPc. The ￿rst requirement can be tested. It turns out
that we have a very strong ￿rst stage. The second requirement, which can be stated as
follows Cov(^ c;c) = 0, is not testable, since c can not be observed.
A potential concern is that if the level of the UP is correlated over time, and past levels
of the UP a￿ected the tax morale of people who came to the USA, and consequently still
in￿uence the tax morale passed on their descendants. In order to fully solve this problem
it would be ideal to control for the level of the UP from the exact date before the ancestors
left their home country. This approach can not be perfectly implemented, since the date
of migration is not known and it varies across observations. However, we can use estimates
on the size of the UP for all countries from the late eighties, denoted by Historical UP c.
This gives a a lag of more than a decade compared to our outcome variable from the year
2000.17 We are con￿dent that after controlling for the historical level of UP in country c,
the inherited part of tax morale a￿ects the size of the current UP only through the channel
of current tax morale.
Table4 shows two di￿erent speci￿cations with varying control variables. In each case
the ￿rst stage shows a highly statistically signi￿cant positive e￿ect of inherited tax morale
and tax morale in the home country. The F-statistic on the excluded instrument is in each
case well above ten ￿ the critical value suggest by Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002). We
conclude that our instrument is su￿ciently strong.
The estimated coe￿cients on the second stage show the expected signs and are reason-
able in size. Considering speci￿cation IV-I, we see that the UP is estimated to be about
6:4 percentage points lower among OECD member states. The sample average is 21:30
percent of the GDP. The historical level of UP is a strong predictor for the size of the UP
in the year 2000. Most importantly, we ￿nd that a higher tax morale decreases the size of
the UP. The estimated coe￿cient ￿ given by the ratios of the reduced form and the ￿rst
stage e￿ect of TMGSS ￿ is about minus 56:80 and statistically signi￿cant at a 5:1 percent
level.18 The beta coe￿cient of minus 0:293 suggests that an increase in tax morale by one
standard deviation (equal to 0:05 points) decreases the size of the UP by 0:293 standard
deviations or 2:84 percentage points. This e￿ect is somewhat lower compared to the ￿xed
e￿ects model. To get a better idea of the quantitative importance of tax morale we consider
an increase of tax morale in Belgium. Belgium has the lowest tax morale in our sample
( ^ BE = 0:69) and an estimated UP of 22:2 percent of GDP. If tax morale would increase
17The estimates are based on the sources cited in footnote 9. Best to our knowledge, no consistent
estimates on the size of UP for a large sample of countries are available before 1989.
18We will provide evidence below that this e￿ect is very robust, and its signi￿cance generally increases
if more covariates are included.
8to the sample average of  c = 0:83 the UP is estimated to decrease to 14:33 percent.
2.2.1 Sensitivity analysis
It is a priori not clear which covariates we should include in our analysis. More control
variables are not necessary better. Control variables which are themselves outcome vari-
ables (i.e. factors that are determined by tax morale) should not be included in the 2SLS
estimation (Angrist and Pischke, 2009, Chapter 3). Papers studying the determinants of
the UP usually control for the o￿cial GDP (e.g. Johnson, Kaufmann, Shleifer, Goldman
and Weitzman, 1997). In fact, GDP is a problematic covariate in our case, since it may be
a￿ected by tax morale. However, in any case, the speci￿cation IV-II in Table4 shows that
including GDP has almost no impact on the estimated size of the UP.
The most important dimension determining the size of the UP put forward by the liter-
ature is governance.19 Scholars emphasize the signi￿cance of low regulatory ‘burden’, less
corruption, and a better rule of law. To check the robustness of our results, we control for
the key dimensions of governance: (i) voice and accountability, (ii) political stability and
absence of violence, (iii) government e￿ectiveness, (iv) regulatory quality, (v) rule of law,
and (vi) control of corruption. The data is from the the Worldwide Governance Indicators
Project provided by the World Bank. These six measures are based on the views of thou-
sands of stakeholders worldwide, including respondents to household and ￿rm surveys, and
experts from nongovernmental organizations, and public sector agencies. 20 In each case
a higher scores indicates a better environment. Since the correlation among the di￿erent
measurements is very high, we include in Table5 one variable in turn. All measurements
of the quality of governance (except voice and accountability) are highly statistically sig-
ni￿cant and enter with a negative sign. Therefore, we can support the hypothesis that
better governance is associated with a lower UP. Most importantly, we observe that the
signi￿cant e￿ect of tax morale persists. Compared to the baseline speci￿cations in Table4,
the estimated e￿ects even increased in size and in statistical signi￿cance. 21
In Table6 we check the sensitivity of our result with respect to the sample chosen.
As mentioned above, Portugal appears to be an outlier (with respect to the size of the
inherited tax morale) that reduces the strength of our ￿rst stage. Speci￿cation R2-II
shows that the F-statistic on the excluded instrument decreases to 10:18; compared to
the baseline speci￿cation with an F-statistic of 14:47 (see speci￿cation R2-I). Nevertheless,
including Portugal does not change the qualitative result in the second stage regression.
We observe an estimated beta coe￿cient of tax morale equal to minus 0:327, which is
statistically signi￿cant at the 6:1 percent level. Similarly, speci￿cation R2-III shows that
19See, for instance, Johnson, Kaufmann, Shleifer, Goldman and Weitzman (1997); Johnson, Kaufmann
and Zoido-Lobat￿n (1998); Friedman, Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton (2000); Dabla-Norris, Grad-
stein and Inchauste (2008).
20Further details are provided by http://www.govindicators.org.
21We also used di￿erent measurements of governance provided by the The Heritage Foundation. Based
on the Heritage Foundation’ economic freedom index (and all its subcomponent) we obtain equivalent
results. Detailed estimation output on is available upon request.
9excluding Belgium (a further potential outlier, see Figure1) increases the signi￿cance of
the estimated impact of tax morale.
Finally, the low number of respondents from certain home countries in the GSS might
be a concern. Therefore, we check the robustness of our results and exclude the ￿ve
home countries (Belgium, Greece, Japan, Portugal and Romania) with the least number of
observations, see speci￿cation R2-IV. This increases the average number of respondents per
home country from 72 to 88. Notably, the lower panel in Table6 shows that the variables
of primary interest have almost identical means in the full and in this reduced sample.
Based on the reduced sample we observe again a negative impact of tax morale. Both, the
estimated (beta) coe￿cient and the standard errors increase in size, however, the e￿ect is
in this small sample still statistically signi￿cant at the 9:2 percent level. We also replicated
the analysis controlling for the quality of governance for our reduced sample, see Table7.
Again, our results are robust to this sample modi￿cation and compared to the baseline
speci￿cation in Table6 we observe an increased statistical signi￿cance.
3 Conclusions
The causal link between tax morale and actual compliance behavior has not been estab-
lished yet. To this extent, it was unclear why economic scholars should be interested in
(the determinants of) tax morale? In this paper we provide convincing evidence that tax
morale causally a￿ects compliance behavior. Exploiting exogenous variation in tax morale
￿ given by the inherited part of tax morale of American-born from their ancestors country
of origin ￿ our IV estimation shows that a higher tax morale reduces the size of the un-
derground production. This evidence increases particularly the signi￿cance of the strand
of literature studying tax morale. It shows that tax morale can indeed help to explain the
puzzle why people pay taxes, despite the existence of low audit probabilities and penalty
rates. More generally, this result con￿rms the supposition that both economic incentives
and social norms (or moral consideration) drive individual behavior.
Our result has also important implications for public policy. It shows that policy makers
can in principal alter tax evasion by manipulating tax morale. Naturally, this conclusion
raises the important question about good instruments for policy reforms. The literature
discusses several institutional arrangements, such as direct democracy (Alm, McClelland
and Schulze, 1999; Feld and Tyran, 2002; Torgler, 2005a), that are correlated with a high
level of tax morale. Feld and Frey (2002) stress the importance of a respectful treatment
of taxpayers by tax authorities. These are important ￿ndings, and scholars should pursue
along these lines to uncover causal relationships. However, our IV approach reveals that
policy reforms intended to increase tax morale may not be very e￿ective in the short-run.
Tax morale is persistent, to a large degree it is inherited over generations, and it might
take some time to change it.22
22See Lindbeck and Nyberg (2006) for an elaborate discussion of parents’ incentives for instilling norms
in their children.
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Figure 1: Correlation between tax morale of Americans by country of origin
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15Table 2: Descriptive statistics of tax morale measurements
TMGSSa
TMWV Sd
Country c Nb Meanc Ne Meanf
Austria 18 0.80 1,475 0.86
Belgium 6 0.61 1,874 0.69
Canada 59 0.85 1,890 0.85
China 13 0.95 973 0.92
Czech Republic 31 0.86 1,867 0.88
Denmark 17 0.80 1,017 0.87
Finland 95 0.79 988 0.82
France 78 0.74 1,543 0.76
Germany 452 0.78 1,986 0.83
Greece 8 0.70 1,052 0.78
Hungary 20 0.88 971 0.85
Ireland 262 0.76 968 0.84
Italy 107 0.72 1,956 0.83
Japan 7 0.97 1,213 0.91
Mexico 76 0.80 1,440 0.84
Netherlands 39 0.92 996 0.81
Norway 44 0.80 1,118 0.81
Philippines 14 0.85 1,177 0.76
Poland 78 0.69 1,068 0.84
Portugal 7 0.52 974 0.81
Romania 4 0.88 1,080 0.77
Russia 34 0.79 2,372 0.78
Spain 25 0.74 1,162 0.84
Sweden 26 0.81 1,009 0.85
Switzerland 17 0.76 1,070 0.80
United Kingdom 339 0.82 937 0.83
72 0.791 1,314 0.824
a This measure of tax morale is based on individual responses to
the following question from the American General Social Survey
of the years 1991 and 1998: ‘Consider the situations listed be-
low. Do you feel it is wrong or not wrong if a taxpayer does not
report all of his income in order to pay less income taxes ’. The
possible answers categories are ‘not wrong ’ ( 1), ‘a bit wrong
’ (2), ‘wrong’ (3) and ‘seriously wrong’ (4).
b Number of avail-
able observations per country of origin.
c These ￿gures give the
share of American-born respondents with ancestors from coun-
try c who answered ‘seriously wrong’ or ‘wrong’.
d This measure
of tax morale is based on individual responses to the follow-
ing question from the European and World Values Surveys of
the years 1999=2000: ‘Please tell me for each of the following
statements whether you think it can always be justi￿ed, never be
justi￿ed, or something in between: Cheating on taxes if you have
a chance’. Respondents are asked to evaluate this statement on
an ordered scale from ‘never justi￿able’ (1) to ‘always justi￿-
able’ (10). For the following countries no survey data for the
year 1999 or 2000 was available and we used information from
the years in brackets: China (2001), Norway (1996), Philippines
(2001) and Switzerland (1996).
e Number of available observa-
tions per home country.
f These ￿gures give the share of respon-
dents from country c who answered between (6) and (10). 16Table 3: Tax morale by country of origin and by the home country a
(I)b (II)c
TMGSS TMWV S
Maled -0.036*** (0.012) -0.034*** (0.004)
Agee 0.002*** (0.000) 0.002*** (0.000)
Marriedf 0.042** (0.016) 0.020*** (0.006)
Religiousg 0.082** (0.032) 0.021*** (0.006)
Year 1998 -0.002 (0.010)
c=c:
Austria 0.804*** (0.027) 0.855*** (0.012)
Belgium 0.609*** (0.024) 0.687*** (0.012)
Canada 0.855*** (0.023) 0.851*** (0.012)
China 0.952*** (0.024) 0.920*** (0.011)
Czech Republic 0.856*** (0.023) 0.877*** (0.012)
Denmark 0.801*** (0.025) 0.874*** (0.012)
Finland 0.790*** (0.025) 0.818*** (0.011)
France 0.745*** (0.024) 0.764*** (0.012)
Germany 0.780*** (0.023) 0.833*** (0.012)
Greece 0.703*** (0.020) 0.778*** (0.009)
Hungary 0.885*** (0.026) 0.853*** (0.012)
Ireland 0.757*** (0.022) 0.841*** (0.012)
Italy 0.715*** (0.022) 0.833*** (0.011)
Japan 0.969*** (0.019) 0.910*** (0.012)
Mexico 0.800*** (0.019) 0.840*** (0.009)
Netherlands 0.916*** (0.025) 0.811*** (0.012)
Norway 0.796*** (0.025) 0.809*** (0.011)
Philippines 0.853*** (0.019) 0.765*** (0.010)
Poland 0.689*** (0.021) 0.843*** (0.012)
Portugal 0.517*** (0.024) 0.805*** (0.012)
Romania 0.883*** (0.028) 0.767*** (0.012)
Russia 0.788*** (0.023) 0.779*** (0.012)
Spain 0.735*** (0.020) 0.839*** (0.011)
Sweden 0.805*** (0.026) 0.851*** (0.011)
Switzerland 0.758*** (0.023) 0.800*** (0.012)
United Kingdom 0.816*** (0.025) 0.833*** (0.011)
Mean of dependent variable 0.791 0.824
No. of observations 1,876 34,176
R-squared 0.861 0.894
a Method of estimation is ordinary least squares. The table shows estimated co-
e￿cients with robust standard errors (allowing for clustering by country and het-
eroskedasticity of unknown form) in round parenthesis below. In squared brackets
beta coe￿cients are reported. *, ** and *** indicate statistical signi￿cance at the
10-percent level, 5-percent level, and 1-percent level, respectively.
b For a de￿nition of
the dependent variable TM
GSS see the notes to Table2.
c For a de￿nition of the de-
pendent variable TM
WV S see the notes to Table2.
d This binary variable is equal to
one if the respondent is male, and zero otherwise.
e This variable capture the respon-
dent’s age.
f This binary variable is equal to one if the respondent is married, and
zero otherwise.
g This binary variable is equal to one if the respondent is a member
of any religious denomination, and zero otherwise.
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c
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c
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c
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b
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c
i
a
l
G
D
P
o
f
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
c
i
n
t
h
e
y
e
a
r
1
9
8
9
=
9
0
.
S
o
u
r
c
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b
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e
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e
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e
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i
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p
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d
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i
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￿
c
i
e
n
t
s
w
i
t
h
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
e
r
r
o
r
i
n
r
o
u
n
d
p
a
r
e
n
t
h
e
s
i
s
b
e
l
o
w
.
I
n
s
q
u
a
r
e
d
b
r
a
c
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b
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￿
c
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c
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￿
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c
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c
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c
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c
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c
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